 PHILOSOPHICAL
APPROACHES
Understanding the exploitation of animals
The author of our opening article in the
Great Debate, Dave Eaton, is 31 years of age and has recently finished a
Masters degree in environmental philosophy at Lancaster University. Prior to
this he spent five years studying for a part-time degree in Humanities, while
working. He has been vegan for approximately thirteen years and currently lives
in Nottingham.
Introduction
Although most people who become vegetarian or choose to support
the various causes commonly associated with "animal rights" do so
because of a felt sense of injustice and a natural empathy for the suffering
of exploited animals, there is a growing philosophical effort to formulate a
clear understanding of why the current relationship of western society with
non-human animals is so intuitively wrong.
Various approaches have been taken to this problem and what follows is a basic
introduction to what are arguably the three most significant of these. Presenting
these ideas in this format will not do full justice to their complexity, or
indeed to the excellent work that has been done by many other writers. The purpose
of what follows is to stimulate thinking and debate amongst Animal Aid supporters
about how to understand and convey most effectively our awareness that the kinds
of animal abuse systematically practiced by our society are wrong.
The following are the three approaches that will be outlined:
- Tom Regan's claim that animals should be understood to have formal moral
rights.
- Peter Singer's emphasis on utilitarianism and the expanding moral circle.
- The work of several ecofeminist writers, most notably Carol J. Adams, in
investigating the social and cultural mechanisms that allow systematic oppression
to exist.
Tom Regan, moral rights for animals
 The
term "animal rights" is commonly used in a loose sense as a label
for the movement that opposes such forms of animal abuse as hunting, vivisection
and the meat industry. This usage is accepted and understood without the need
for a well defined theory of what specific rights animals should possess. However,
Tom Regan, a leading American philosopher, has advanced a theory claiming that
animals should be recognised as having rights analogous to human rights, and
that these rights should be considered to be inviolable except in certain very
specific instances.
In his book The Case for Animal Rights (1)
Regan offers a very thorough exploration of his claim that a being is entitled
to be considered as having rights if that being is the "experiencing subject-of-a-life".
Regan considers that the fact of being experiencing subjects-of-a-life is something
that animals and humans have in common and that this is morally relevant in
understanding why it is wrong to use either without due regard for their interests.
He shows that differences between animals and humans that have been claimed
to explain why humans may be thought to have rights but animals may not are
either not relevant or are incoherent when examined in detail. For example,
it may be claimed that humans are rational beings or that they are "moral
agents" (able to understand and obey moral rules), that animals are not,
and therefore that this gives to humans rights that animals do not possess.
Regan points out that by this reasoning, very young children and humans that
have severe mental handicaps must logically be considered not to have rights,
and that this is contrary to what we feel to be true. He finds no relevant or
coherent differences that separate all humans from all animals, other than the
difference of species, and therefore points out that the denial of rights to
animals is speciesist - a form of prejudice analogous to racism or sexism.
Regan considers several ethical approaches to correcting this wrong, concluding
that the extension of rights to animals is the only option that adequately addresses
the many moral dilemmas that may be thrown up.
Regan does however carefully distinguish moral rights from legal rights. He
claims that moral rights are universal, whereas legal rights vary from country
to country and from time to time. His argument is that animals possess moral
rights and therefore that vegetarianism is morally obligatory and hunting, trapping
and vivisection are wrong. The enactment of laws giving legal rights is not
specifically called for by Regan, although this is a logical inference of his
approach. A recent book, Rattling the Cage: Towards Legal Rights for Animals,
(2) by Steven M. Wise (who teaches
Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School) examines exactly this issue and
argues powerfully for a progressive extension of legal rights to animals, beginning
with chimpanzees and bonobos. Regan's approach concerns itself primarily with
setting out a compelling argument for individuals to modify their behaviour
and bases this argument firmly in the established traditions of logical philosophy.
Peter Singer, utilitarianism and the expanding moral circle
 Peter
Singer's book Animal Liberation (3)
is occasionally credited with rejuvenating the animal rights movement in the
mid-seventies. It is a hugely influential book by a leading moral philosopher
whose interests also span many other issues.
In Animal Liberation Singer makes a powerful case against the modern
meat industry and against vivisection. In other publications he has set out
more fully the detail of the ethical principles underlying his condemnation
of these practices. Singer advocates utilitarianism as a guide to ethically
good behaviour. Utilitarianism favours actions that bring about the greatest
overall sum of happiness in the world, and the least overall sum of pain. Utilitarianism
is an accepted principle on which many decisions are supposedly made by those
who govern our society. However, it is a principle which is usually only applied
to balancing the happiness and pain of human beings. Singer demonstrates that
there are no reasonable grounds for not extending the same moral principle to
the welfare of other animals.
Utilitarianism provides an approach to morality with significant differences
from the rights approach. For example, whereas any use of animals for harmful
experiments would constitute an unacceptable infringement of their rights, the
utilitarian emphasis on the overall sum of happiness/pain means that
Singer endorses in theory the idea that conducting certain medical experiments
on animals may be justifiable if (and only if) it would definitely lead to the
relief of a greater amount of pain than would be inflicted. It is important
to point out, though, that Singer insists on the equal consideration of the
interests of animals and humans and the fact that these interests may be different
due to their differing natures is the only valid basis on which different
treatment may be appropriate. This means that forcibly conducting experiments
on animals is only preferable to conducting them on humans insofar as the greater
comprehension of their predicament is likely to significantly increase the subjective
level of suffering experienced by humans. It also means that conducting experiments
on animals in cases where a wider benefit is not immediately apparent is unsupportable,
and therefore that the great majority of experiments currently carried out on
animals are morally intolerable, motivated as they are by economic rather than
humanitarian factors.
The application of utilitarian thinking to the western meat industry unequivocally
condemns that industry. The consumption of meat in the western world is shown
to be a luxury, producing no overall benefit other than the fairly insignificant
amount of pleasure produced by the fact that some people enjoy its taste. When
that pleasure is contrasted against the massive amounts of suffering inflicted
on meat-animals (4) (particularly
as the horrific conditions inflicted by the factory farming system proliferate)
it becomes apparent that there is no justification for the consumption of meat
in the West. The negative effects of meat-eating on human health, and the enormous
consumption of grain by meat-animals that could otherwise relieve the hunger
of disadvantaged societies can, of course, be factored in to the equation to
make it more complete.
Singer's work not only elaborates the implications of extending utilitarian
thought to animals however - it also contains a fascinating analysis of ideas
about how morality may have originated in evolution and why these ideas support
the extension of moral concern beyond the boundary of the human species. The
discipline of sociobiology (5)
purports to have discovered the foundations of human ethical thought in co-operation
between individuals for the biological end of increasing the reproduction of
one's genes into the next generation. Ethical behaviour is thought to be inextricably
linked with the impulse towards altruism (acting in the interests of others
rather than oneself). The evolutionary roots of altruism are considered to lie
in social behaviour such as kin altruism (helping those who carry similar genes
to oneself, and therefore helping those genes to survive) and reciprocal altruism
(in which it is understood that by doing a good deed for another individual
one reaps the reward of that individual returning the favour at some time in
the future). In addition, because co-operation in such enterprises as hunting
or gathering food will increase the chances of success, individuals who co-operate
with each other are likely to have better survival (and hence reproductive)
chances than those who act selfishly. Natural selection can therefore be seen
to favour altruistic behaviour to some degree, and a genetic tendency to act
in this way (though clearly not always to act in this way) has become established
in our species, amongst others.
Singer, in his book The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology, (6)
outlines these ideas and discusses the development of altruism from behaviour
that is motivated by a kind of genetic selfishness into behaviour that carries
more objective connotations of right and wrong. Singer shows that human moral
obligations have been gradually rippling outward through the development of
our history, so that while originally individuals gave moral consideration only
to family/social group members, this later came to encompass larger groups,
then nations, races, all humans, and at the stage we are coming to now, animals.
Some thinkers influenced by sociobiology believe that this discipline authorises
a limited, fundamentally selfish, view of ethics in which only those who will
directly reciprocate moral concern in exactly the same terms should be included
within the ethical circle. Singer, however, emphasises that the process of moral
concern has an internal dynamic of its own, driven by the capacity for rational,
objective thought and that the only appropriate stopping point for the expansion
of the ethical circle is the point at which all those affected by our actions
are included.
A fascinating book that lends a great deal of support to Singer's expanding
circle idea is the primatologist Franz de Waal's Good Natured: The Origins
of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. (7)
De Waal concerns himself with observations of primate behaviour, particularly
moral and helping behaviour. De Waal suggests that in primate society moral
and helping behaviour will indeed expand outwards, based on the availability
of resources. Therefore, if a group is prospering, then moral and helping behaviour
becomes more common toward strangers and if a group is suffering hardship, then
the circle will constrict and only one's closest will be helped. This conclusion
is obviously immensely relevant to the situation of privileged westerners, who
have absolutely no need to exploit other animal species in order to live a full
and complete life. It also shows that being vegetarian or supporting animal
rights in the west does not imply criticism of human societies less privileged
than our own, who may actually depend on eating flesh to survive. De Waal also
offers an interesting comment on the extension of ethical behaviour beyond the
social in-group who are currently able to reciprocate it, claiming that "in
the same way that birds and airplanes appear to defy the law of gravity yet
are fully subjected to it, moral decency may appear to fly in the face of natural
selection yet still be one of its many products". (8)
Ecofeminism and the commonality between different types of oppression
 An
immensely fruitful source of important ideas for understanding and improving
the way that our society treats animals is provided by the work of several ecofeminist
philosophers. Ecofeminism is a fairly new field of ideas that uses the insights
of feminism to shed light on the domination of animals, the natural world, and
underprivileged societies by western culture.
Central to ecofeminist theory is the influence of dualisms on western thought.
Val Plumwood, in her book Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, (9)
argues that patriarchal western thought is structured around a series of mutually
reinforcing dualisms such as, for example, male/female, human/nonhuman, culture/nature
and rational/emotional that impose a value structure which is tailored to preserving
the dominance of white male human elites. In each of the dualisms mentioned
above there is a presumption that the first is superior to the latter and the
two are commonly understood to have meaning primarily by being opposites. Ecofeminism
argues for greater equality by disputing the oppositions that these dualisms
suggest, putting emphasis on continuity and complementarity, and demonstrating
that the unnatural dominance of one over the other has led the world toward
the large scale problems, such as environmental crisis, massive social inequality
and unjustifiable human exploitation of other species, that currently plague
it.
An important strand to ecofeminist thinking is the rejection of purely rational
moral codes. One of the central feminist books is Carol Gilligan's In a Different
Voice, (10) which argued
against Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development. Kohlberg had claimed
that the moral development of individuals passes through various stages toward
a moral maturity characterised by the following of principles. Psychological
experiments found that women tended to solve practical moral dilemmas in a way
that had less regard for abstract principles than men, and there was a suggestion
that women were somehow less able to reach a full moral maturity than men were.
Gilligan famously demonstrated that although women tended not to follow abstract
principles as strictly as men, their approach was based on a different type
of moral thinking (a type that was less legalistic) and that they solved problems
based on a desire to reach the most satisfactory conclusion for all concerned.
Ecofeminism takes this approach very much as a central theme, and this has led
to some criticism of the work of Peter Singer and Tom Regan for being based
too much in abstract ethical rules that suggest intellectual detachment from
emotional responses to animal suffering.
One of the leading ecofeminist thinkers on this topic is Marti Kheel (11)
who has claimed that abstract ethical theories do not satisfy those who feel
that morality lies within their own personal responses to real ethical dilemmas.
She emphasises the fact that within the modern western world most individuals
are shielded from direct knowledge of the consequences of their meat-eating.
The social conditions imposed by modern capitalist culture separate most people
from the production of food, and therefore the abominable situations in which
many food-animals now live can be conveniently ignored. Kheel suggests a version
of morality in which full knowledge of, and emotional confrontation with, the
consequences of our actions is the main priority. She also believes that the
predominance of concepts such as rights (in a formal sense) is symptomatic of
the failure of our natural, relational moral instincts.
Perhaps the most significant single contribution to ecofeminst thinking about
animal abuse has been made by Carol J. Adams. Adams has made a detailed analysis
of the social and cultural politics surrounding the issue of meat eating. She
points out that there is little middle ground in this debate - one either eats
meat or one doesn't. Unfortunately this places vegetarians at a distinct disadvantage
as they are in a minority. Adams examines many of the ways in which legitimacy
is denied to arguments for vegetarianism by the dominant perspective. She points
out that people who eat meat often view the existence of vegetarians as a personal
challenge and employ a variety of means to attempt to make vegetarianism appear
ridiculous. One of her most fascinating observations is that the power to set
the boundaries of a discussion is usually set by those with the least
knowledge about the matter, and therefore that although vegetarians in general
may know more about the actual facts surrounding the production of meat, the
resistance of meat-eaters to this knowledge automatically places vegetarians
at a disadvantage. Meat-eating is presumed to be a normal activity within western
culture, and vegetarians, when their arguments begin to appear threatening to
this activity, can be absorbed within the dominant culture by being represented
either as deviant or as representative of a minority interest. Accusations that
caring about animal suffering is "emotional" or even "feminine"
help to reduce the perceived seriousness of the issues and to mute the impact
of arguments.
Adams points out that central to the ability of the dominant culture to absorb
vegetarianism in this way is the claim that meat-eating is natural. This claim
ignores the enormous differences between natural forms of predation and the
way in which animals are kept in western farming systems, especially factory
farming (which Adams terms "the animal-industrial complex") (12).
Adams insists that rather than being natural, modern institutional animal abuse
is a political act and can only be adequately understood in this way. It arises
from the conjunction of the western dualistic view of animals (in which they
are understood primarily as being not-human, and therefore as inferior to humans)
with the needs of the capitalist system and its overriding impulse toward economic
efficiency. Animals are essentially rendered invisible by this system and are
perceived not as beings with different characteristics to ourselves, but as
things that are available for our unlimited use. Adams emphasises the importance
of resisting this understanding of animals. Her writing is firmly grounded in
the specifics of western economic and cultural relationships with animals and
passionately celebrates resistance to the currently oppressive nature of those
relationships. Her work, despite the attention she draws to the contemporary
situation, emphasises hope and faith that things can improve. As she claims
at the end of her first book, The Sexual Politics of Meat:
"To destabilize patriarchal consumption, eat rice have faith in women.
By doing so... we restore wholeness to our fragmented relationships with each
other and the other animals. The question before us is, which images of the
universe, of power, of animals, of ourselves, will we represent in our food?
Of that which has preceded us, what shall remain." (13)
Closing thoughts
 The
various approaches outlined here are not 100% compatible with each other, and
there has been some limited mutual criticism between the authors of the different
approaches. My own opinion is that the ecofeminist approach has the most relevance
to the complex business of living a morally good life in modern society. While
formal theories such as Regan's "rights" approach or Singer's utilitarianism
are useful in showing how the interests of animals can be fitted into existing
moral concepts, I can't help feeling that the systematised approach that they
take to moral dilemmas will inevitably always be lacking because it can never
take account of all possible factors in the real world.
In addition, these theories, although undoubtedly rooted in a passionate emotional
response to the plight of exploited animals, may risk contributing to a much
less obvious problem. The elevation of logical or legalistic theories has been
linked by some writers to the distancing of modern humans from an adequate awareness
of the nature that exists within them. We absorb the emphasis that our culture
places on objectivity and rationality, and risk alienating ourselves from other
kinds of awareness about who we are and what kinds of relationships to the world
and the other beings within it are genuinely healthy. (14)
I strongly believe that the animal liberation movement represents a healthy
rejection of the role that western culture attempts to give us - a role that
involves buying whatever commodities are offered for sale without questioning
the processes that bring these commodities into being. By refusing to accept
the fragmentation of life in this way we restore a bond that has been broken,
both outside and within us, and make ourselves more whole, and our culture less
mechanistic. We don't need a systematic laying out of what our obligations are
in order to do this, we need to understand in depth the true nature of the relationships
that make us, and we need to care enough to make those relationships better.
My opinion is only one opinion, however, and understanding is nearly always
deepened by constructive debate. For this reason, Animal Aid would like to invite
anybody who cares about the suffering of exploited animals to contribute their
own thoughts about the issues that it raises. Contributions are invited on the
following subjects:
- Are systematised moral theories actually more useful than I have suggested?
- Does the suggestion that moral concern originates in evolutionary adaptation
imply a dangerous moral relativism that undermines attempts to expand the
circle of inclusion?
- If it is accepted that vegetarianism is morally right for privileged westerners,
is eating flesh acceptable for cultures living closer to nature? And if so,
is it acceptable for westerners who choose to live closer to the land and
perhaps supplement their diet by catching wild rabbits or other free-living
creatures?
References:
- Tom Regan, The Case For Animal Rights (1983),
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
- Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage: Towards Legal
Rights for Animals (2000), London: Profile Books
- Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (1990), London:
Jonathon Cape (Originally published 1975)
- Please see the relevant other sections of Animal
Aid's website if you are not familiar with the details of this
suffering.
- The major founding work in this field is Edward
O. Wilson's Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975), Cambridge,
Mass.: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press. Another major
contribution is Richard Dawkins' The Selfish Gene (1976), Oxford:
Oxford University Press
- Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethhcs and
Sociobiology (1981), Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Franz de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of
Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (1996), Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press
- Franz de Waal, Good Natured, p.12
- Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature
(1990), London: Routledge
- Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (1982),
Cambridge: Harvard University Press
- See, particularly, Marti Kheel, "The Liberation
of Nature: A Circular Affair" in Environmental Ethics Vol.7,
Summer 1985, p.135-149 or Marti Kheel, "From Heroic to Holistic
Ethics: The Ecofeminist Challenge" in Greta Gaard (Ed.),
Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature (1993), Philadelphia: Temple
University Press
- Carol J. Adams, Neither Man Nor Beast (1995),
New York: Continuum Publishing Company, p.113
- Carol J. Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat
(1990), Cambridge: Polity Press, p.190
- See, for example, David W. Kidner, Nature and
Psyche: Radical Environmentalism and the Politics of Subjectivity
(2001), Albany: State University of New York Press
Remember, you don't have to be a philosophy graduate to take
part in the Great Debate. Nor do you
have to speak a complicated special language. If you have a thoughtful, well
reasoned set of ideas that you believe would carry the debate forward, then
we want to hear from you. Please send an outline of your proposed article (no
more than 200 words) to info@animalaid.org.uk
- mark it: GREAT DEBATE.
Please tell your friends and add a link from your own website
- the address for the Great Debate
is www.animalaid.org.uk/debate.
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